The discussion focused on two main points: accountability and governance.
Regarding accountability, people felt this should be seen not only as an issue of roles and responsibilities, which at present has a rather ‘punitive’ bias, but also as a value that should be important to everybody, from Centre local staff, scientists and directors to donors and the Fund Council. There was good consensus on the need to develop a coherent framework that simplifies management and clarifies what accountability means.
Discussion on governance issues centred around the Fund Council and Funders’ Summit. There seems to be some desire to revisit the Maputo decision regarding membership of the Fund Council, with some donors advocating for a shareholder model, i.e. the Council members should be contributing donors only, rather than including a range of stakeholders. It was felt that this might improve the efficiency of decision-making and incentivise donors to contribute. On the minimum threshold contribution for members there was no consensus. Neither was consensus reached on whether the Funders’ Summit would serve as an overarching governance body.
Lystra Antoine and Shey Tata, who worked with Ren Wang on drafting the Framework Document for the CGIAR Fund
Filed under: CGIAR Change Management, CGIAR Donor Workshop in London Apr09
Will some sort of document giving a summary of the meeting also be available, in addition to the updates on this blog site?
Please see http://cgiarchangemanagement.wordpress.com/2009/05/06/tmt-journalupdate-3-message-from-cgiar-chair-katherine-sierra/
More information will be available following the current meeting of the CGIAR Executive Committee in Cali this week.
Swedish University of Agricultural Sciences
Division for Legal Affairs, finance and human resources and Department of Plant biology and forest genetics. Associate professor Carl-Gustaf Thornström, member CGIAR Genetic Resources Policy Committee and Executive Director Advanced International Training Programme: Genetic Resources and Intellectual Property rights
Framework document for the CGIAR Fund
Draft 2, May 15, 2009
Comments by Carl-Gustaf Thornström, May 28, 2009
Background: Swedish funding from 1973-2008
¤ Total: 1.6 billion SEK = 245 million USD
¤ Annually ca 3% down to 2% out of the total CGIAR-budget
¤ Core funding: ca 1.3 billion SEK (ca: 200 MUSD)
¤ Restricted/special projects: ca 300 million SEK (ca 45 MUSD)
¤ Thus, during 1973-2008, Sweden has provided some 25-40 MUSD to fill up other non paid full costs resulting from restricted funding! The latter never feature as “donors” when CG-centres give presentations at meetings.
Having been involved in/with the CGIAR since 1981 (through SAREC, Sida/SAREC and Sida) I have experienced the TAC inclusion/set up of new centres 1987-1993; the Serageldin funding matrix reform 1994-2000; the Ian Johnson change of meeting formats/committee reduction 2000-2007 and now the Consortium process. 1981-2000 I was member/head/dpty head of Swedish delegation to the CGIAR. Since 2000 I’ve been senior adviser to Sida on CGIAR-matters. I have also served in several ad hoc sub-groups over three decades. Further: during 1996-2001 I was a member of the CGIAR Finance Committee and its working group 1999-2001. I am also a member of the GRPC 1999-2009. During 1997-2004 I held the chair of the ICIPE Sponsoring Group. Attending more than 23 CGIAR ICW/AGMs and 15 MTMs. I have also been in the European donors group from 1981-94 and in EIARD 1995-2003. With this background I have been around for more than a quarter of a century of the CGIAR developments. Thus I might have learnt something –not least about donor behaviour..
Nowadays we all refer to the Paris-agenda i e harmonizing donor funding in ODA.
In view of my experience of earlier attempts to slim/rationalize the CGIAR the ongoing reform process is extremely important and crucial for the healthy transformation of the CGIAR into a modern player on the increasingly complicated R&D field. I expect and take for granted that CGIAR-donors consider very seriously their obligations under the Paris agenda. The following comments are based on selected documents presented at meetings in London November 2008 and in April 2009. The current new “skeleton” being discussed still has weak joints at crucial points and these need support bandages that must be strengthened –especially as regards double taxing bilateral funds and excluding some donors from membership
1. Basic conditions for success of the reformed CGIAR are to combine:
a) strategic objectives, entire CG-portfolio, mega programs, and centres with
b) non-corrosive funding mechanism (clear sticks and carrots)
c) timetable, milestones
d) fall back positions
2. Members of Fund -questionable if CG-centre HQ-countries automatically shall be members of Funders Forum
3. Fund Council membership. Minimum 1 MUSD in unrestricted funding by OECD donor for eligibility to fund council. For southern donors, to a total of 0.5 MUSD in cash or in kind
4. Stakeholders invited as active observers at Fund Council meetings
5. Service in the Council 2 years. Too short. Should be 3-4 years.
6. Decisions making in the Council as proposed. Chair must have authority to break the tie. No objection basis may be vulnerable as regards real commitment
7. WB hosting Fund Office. Geopolitically sensitive: US/Washington. Why not using the premises of a UN-organization in Africa or Asia? Or in Rome (parallel to FAO and IFAD)?
8. Independent CG-centres delegating powers and functions to Consortium Board/office. Which are the sticks and carrots? Needs much further clarification. Centre HQ-agreements with host countries: new legal status of the CG-genebanks and the current agreement with FAO-IT and its governing body. Will Consortium take over legal obligations under the agreement with the FAO-IT? What will this mean? Andean Community countries and decision 391 vs new legal status for CIP and CIAT gene banks?
9. Bilateral donors –the real trouble makers! Only those who clearly support the CGIAR strategic results framework and providing full cost recovery/overheads shall be accepted. Need to realize that it is better to start the reformed CGIAR with a lower total budget (than present) but which has higher financial integrity to match the strategic objectives with sound funding, and that does not dilute the Consortium’s research agenda. If discipline is not exercised here the reformed CGIAR may easily derail back to the current 30% core.. Some donors may have to be actively asked to leave the Fund Council because of non-compliance with the CGIAR mission, strategy and necessary funding structure.
10. Funding targets. Total annual amount is less important than shifting the balance between core and restricted/bilateral funds. The framework document needs to develop a clear time table with targets in moving 30% core up to 70% core in the next 3-4 years. Including realistic fall back positions (that protects the financial integrity) if targets are not reached. In a worst case the CGIAR might have to run on a lower total budget in order to maintain the strategic results objectives and intellectual integrity and trustworthiness.
11. The Consortium Board and the Fund Council must have the capacity and authority to say NO do donors who exercise bilateral funding conditions not in harmony with the CGIAR strategic results framework.
12. Further on Funding: to which extent can restricted funds finance segments/subprograms in Mega-programmes?
13. If you hand out 450 fresh MUSD to current donors provided that they give all money to the CGIAR -would they distribute their funds mainly as core? Not even then would they give more than around 50-60% core…probably at best.
14. Which would be a “dirty table” that loud and clear shows least obedient donors when it comes to support the strategic results framework– and noting whatever the “rational” explanation is?
15. Acceptance of development money. Today more than 60% of the CGIAR budget is in essence ODA-money meant for development –not research proper. Is this fact accommodated in the upcoming financing plan? Much further clarification is needed here.
16. In summary: the continued change process need to clearly specify the following issues:
¤ Delete the 3-5 least obedient donors (greatly violating the Paris agenda) from being invited to fund the CGIAR. Could mean saying no to at least 15% of overall annual funding
¤ Double the tax on bilateral funding plus full cost recovery
¤ Get a firm decision on precise milestones and timetable including sticks/carrots for the change process over the next 3-5 years
¤ Fall back positions if goals are not achieved such as:
- Refrain for trying to “save the agenda” by accepting bilateral funding as “solution” (which has been the case earlier)
- Consider seriously to ask donors to step down if their ´contributions´ seriously corrode the implementation of the strategic results framework
- Consider active slimming and closing down of whole Mega-programmes and/or Centres. Indeed very serious –but better than let them go bankrupt
- Establish a Consortium ´Security fall back fund´ to care for emergencies caused by unacceptable non-Paris agenda behaviour
- Protect the system/Consortium!
Kindest regards
Carl-Gustaf Thornström